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Law Association of Zambia v. the Attorney General 
(Appeal No. 8/2014) [2016] ZMSC 243.  
Muna Ndulo and Samuel Ndungu 
 
The Facts  
This appeal concerned the constitutionality of Sections 5 and 6 of the Public 
Order Act. The Law Association of Zambia had unsuccessfully argued in 
the High Court that these Sections violated Articles 20 and 21 of the 
Constitution of Zambia, which provide for the protection of freedom of 
expression and the protection of freedom of assembly and association. The 
appeal sought to overturn the decision of the High Court. 
 
The Holding  
The Supreme Court agreed with the High Court that the Public Order Act, 
as amended by Act No. 36 of 1996 is constitutional. The Court opined that 
the amendment had addressed the concerns expressed in the Mulundika 
judgment – namely, that the police cannot deny permits to people who apply 
to hold a public demonstration. The Court however found that Section 5 (6) 
of the Act fell short of the constitutional threshold, as it does not give the 
police an obligation to suggest a “reasonable alternative date in the very 
near future”, and that the police had used this loophole to constructively 
deny people their right to protest.  
 
Significance 
In this commentary, we argue that this judgment does not effectively protect 
the rights of peaceful assembly and expression. First, it suffers from the 
same weaknesses as the Mulundika judgment, in that it does not fully 
appreciate the nature of the right of assembly and the freedom of 
expression. Secondly, it does not adequately capture all aspects of 
constructive denial of freedom of expression that are brought about by the 
1996 amendment to the Public Order Act, specifically by Section 5(6), and 
its lack of guidelines for the police. This makes Section 5(6) fundamentally 
unconstitutional. The Court fails to realize that Section 5 (6) fundamentally 
operates as a limitation on the constitutional rights to peaceful assembly and 
expression. 
 
Weakness of the Mulundika Judgment Replicated 
The 1996 amendment to the Public Order Act did much to enhance the 
protection of the freedom of peaceful assembly and expression. The 
previous language in the Public Order Act empowered the police to control 
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who can talk at an assembly, the duration of the assembly, and the content 
that can be discussed at the assembly.1 These requirements were replaced 
under the 1996 amendment with new ones: all that is required is a 
notification to the police of the date, duration and location of the assembly, 
whether it be a static one or a demonstration/protest that follows a path.2 
However, there remained an undertone that the rights of peaceful assembly 
must be policed – that they are subject to the police’s ability to police them 
and that the police can deny or cancel a permit on the grounds that the 
police cannot police the assembly.3 This detracts from the fundamental 
nature of the right.  
 
The right of peaceful assembly is recognized as a fundamental right 
worldwide. Article 21 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) specifies that no restrictions may be placed on the right, 
except those that are “necessary in a democratic society in the interests of 
national security or public safety, public order, the protection of public 
health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”4  
 
Similarly, Article 11 of the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights 
provides that:  
 
Every individual shall have the right to assemble freely with others. 
The exercise of this right shall be subject only to necessary restrictions 
provided for by law, in particular those enacted in the interest of 
national security, the safety, health, ethics and rights and freedoms of 
others.5 
 
As we demonstrate, there is consensus worldwide that the right to peaceful 
assembly and expression are fundamental to political speech. This is why 
they are viewed as fundamental in a democratic society, where views that 
may only be held by a minority may not find expression in other fora, 
leading to the necessity of peaceful assembly and expression within the 
                                                
1  Previous Section 5 (5) of the Public Order Act.  
2  Section 5 (5) as amended.  
3  This is the import of Section 5 (6) of the Public Order Act, which allows police 
to prohibit a public meeting because they are unable to police it.  
4  Article 21, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.  
5  African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, 1979. 
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assembly. Legal restrictions or ‘clawbacks’6 are allowed in the interests of 
keeping the peace, protecting private property, or respecting the rights, and 
not merely the sensibilities, of other people.  
 
It is immediately noticeable that Section 5 of the Public Order Act, as 
amended, does not meet this threshold set out by the ICCPR. The language 
of Section 5 does not limit the restrictions to the freedom of assembly to 
only those “necessary” for national security or public safety, public order, 
health or morality. It is even more telling that the right of assembly in 
Article 21 (2) of the Constitution conforms to the ICCPR:  
(2)  Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be 
held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of this Article to the 
extent that it is shown that the law in question makes provision –  
(a) that is reasonably required in the interests of defence, public 
safety, public order, public morality or public health;  
(b) that is reasonably required for the purpose of protecting the rights 
or freedoms of other persons;  
 
Section 5 (6) of the Act simply states: “Where it is not possible for the 
Police to adequately police any particular public meeting,” the police may 
inform the conveners of their inability and suggest an alternative date. What 
is conspicuously missing from this Act is a provision that ensures that any 
restrictions to the freedom of assembly satisfy the conditions set out in 
Article 21 of the Constitution. The inability to police a public meeting is not 
one such restriction, in and of itself. It should be shown that should the 
meeting go on without police presence, there is a probability, more than a 
mere possibility, that there would be a breach of the peace as a result. The 
test is not subjective, nor one entirely for the police. It must be based on 
objective criteria. This is the tenor of the United Kingdom’s Public Order 
Act, which despite being similar to the Zambian Act in the requirement of 
notices to the police for public processions and assemblies, takes a more 
                                                
6  R. Goodrick, The Right of Peaceful Protest in International Law and Australian 
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serious view of the power of the police to stop a procession. Consider 
section 12 which provides: 
(1) If the senior police officer, having regard to the time or place at which 
and the circumstances in which any public procession is being held or 
is intended to be held and to its route or proposed route, reasonably 
believes that – 
(a)  it may result in serious public disorder, serious damage to 
property or serious disruption to the life of the community, or 
(b) the purpose of the persons organising it is the intimidation of 
others with a view to compelling them not to do an act they have 
a right to do, or to do an act they have a right not to do, he may 
give directions imposing on the persons organising or taking part 
in the procession such conditions as appear to him necessary to 
prevent such disorder, damage, disruption or intimidation, 
including conditions as to the route of the procession or 
prohibiting it from entering any public place specified in the 
directions.7 
 
This provision is grounded in the understanding that the right to peaceful 
assembly is indeed a fundamental right; and one that does not need the 
midwifery of the police. The police are allowed to step in where the 
assembly is, for serious reasons, suspected of not being peaceful. The police 
cannot prohibit an assembly solely on the ground that no permit was issued 
for the assembly. The assumption of the automatic need for a permit for 
assembly in the Public Order Act is therefore unwarranted and 
unconstitutionally abrogates the right to peaceful assembly.  
 
The mistake here is not just one for the legislature, though. The Supreme 
Court, both in the Mulundika case and in this case, has shown a somewhat 
short-sighted view of the fundamental nature of the right to peaceful 
assembly. In Mulundika, the provisions being subjected to constitutional 
scrutiny were egregious, and the Court was largely cognizant of this. 
However, it failed to recognize that the power to issue directions must be 
constrained by the conditions in the Constitution, namely, public peace, 
morality and the protection of the property and rights of other people. The 
Court proceeded on the assumption that police oversight into the exercise of 
this right was necessary. 
                                                
7  Public Order Act (UK), 1986, S. 12.  
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Although not guided by concern for the administrative consequences, we 
readily accept and acknowledge that there are many regulatory features in 
the Public Order Act which are perfectly constitutional and very necessary 
for the sake of public peace and order. This is common cause. For instance, 
there are subsections authorizing the issuing of directions and conditions for 
the purpose of regulating the route of a procession; the date, place and time 
of an assembly or a procession; their duration and any other matter designed 
to preserve public peace and order.  
 
However it appears that in the Court’s mind, peaceful assembly cannot be 
peaceful without police presence. The Court rightly upheld the requirement 
to give notice to the police of a public meeting, but wrongly attributed it to 
the need for the police to exercise a “regulatory function” over assemblies, 
stating that: “In this regard, we hold the view that the requirement for notice 
is necessary, as this is the only way that the police can perform their 
regulatory function and maintain law and order in our society”.8 The flaw in 
the conception of the fundamental nature of the right is revealed; the Court 
does not place the evidentiary burden on the police to show that they must 
regulate a public assembly. Regulation is seen as a foregone conclusion, a 
necessity for the enjoyment of the fundamental right. This therefore 
explains why the power granted to the police to cancel a public meeting and 
suggest a date in the near future because they (the police) cannot “regulate” 
it adequately, without necessarily showing that the inability to regulate 
would result in a breach of the peace, has gone unchecked.  
 
This question of whether the police should regulate at all in the interests of 
peace is seen in the EU case of Éva Molnár v Hungary.9 In interpreting 
Article 21 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Freedoms, which is identical to Article 21 of the Zambian Constitution, the 
Court held that there was no assumption that the policing of a peaceful 
assembly was required by the Constitution. Thus, the breaking up of a 
spontaneous peaceful assembly, for which notice could not be given, would 
be an unnecessary abrogation of the right to peaceful assembly: the Court 
stated:  
 
                                                
8  Law Society of Zambia v the Attorney General, Appeal No. SCZ/8/333/2013.  
9  Law Society of Zambia v the Attorney General, Appeal No. SCZ/8/333/2013.  
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[I]n special circumstances when an immediate response might be 
justified, for example in relation to a political event, in the form of a 
spontaneous demonstration, to disperse the ensuing demonstration 
solely because of the absence of the requisite prior notice, without any 
illegal conduct by the participants, may amount to a disproportionate 
restriction on freedom of peaceful assembly...It is important for the 
public authorities to show a certain degree of tolerance towards 
peaceful gatherings if the freedom of assembly guaranteed by Article 
11 of the Convention is not to be deprived of all substance.10 
 
The failure of the Supreme Court to appreciate the fundamental nature of 
the right to peaceful assembly further blinds it to another flaw in Section 5 
(5) (e) of the Public Order Act. This section outlines one of the conditions 
that the conveners of the public meeting have to meet, and which the police 
may rely upon to justify the cancellation of a planned public meeting. That 
section states that the “public meeting, procession or demonstration shall 
not create a risk to security or public safety, a breach of the peace or 
disaffection amongst the inhabitants of that neighbourhood [emphasis 
added].” The emphasized portion of the provision in effect gives the police 
the power to regulate the content of the opinions to be expressed at a public 
meeting. Had the Court appreciated the fundamental nature of the freedom 
of expression, it would have made it clear that such power is incompatible 
with the inalienable stature of a fundamental right. While a Constitution can 
limit the kinds of expression that are not protected – for example, libel and 
defamation11 – no such restrictions can be given for unpopular views. The 
freedom to air unpopular views is the very essence of the freedom of speech 
and assembly. Two American cases illustrate this. In Edwards v South 
Carolina,12 the US Supreme Court held that a State could not criminalize 
“the peaceful expression of unpopular views.” In National Socialist Party v 
Village of Skokie,13 the Supreme Court upheld an Illinois Supreme Court 
decision that would not ban the Nazi Party from organising a peaceful 
protest because of the content of their message. Closer to home, the Kenyan 
High Court, in a recent case, underscored the important part that the 
freedom of assembly plays in the ventilation of unpopular views:  
 
                                                
10  Application no. 10346/05, ECHR (7 January 2009). 
11  Article 21 (3) (b), Constitution of Zambia.  
12  372 US 229 (1963). 
13  473 US 43 (1977). 
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It may very well be that the opinion or view is an unpopular one with 
others but yet again, freedom of assembly merely provides an 
alternative form of participating in democracy to those who may be 
disenchanted and uninspired in one way or another. A minority may, 
for example, feel disappointed by their own failure to convince the 
majority. The alternative avenue for expressing their view would 
simply then be through demonstrations and picketing, even though the 
minority may still not have their way.14 
 
As has been argued elsewhere: 
 
Often a demonstration has significant publicity advantages over more 
conventional media of expression since it can attract extensive news 
coverage and widespread public interest; and for persons unpopular or 
unknown to the general public, or without financial resources, a 
demonstration may be the only effective means to publicize a message 
or reach a desired audience.15 
 
These views are in sharp contrast with the position in the Act and the 
position of the Zambian Supreme Court’s judgment in that the 
“disaffection” of locals in the locale of a planned protest is not grounds 
enough for the abrogation of a right, no matter how odious the opinion that 
causes the disaffection. The thrust of the Skokie decision is that freedom of 
expression and assembly are cornerstones of democracy, as they ensure that 
minority, unpopular views are not drowned by the hum of the majority. The 
police have an obligation to protect people expressing unpopular views.  
 
Unfettered Discretion of Police 
Section 5 of the Public Order Act outlines numerous conditions for the 
holding of an assembly, for instance, the applicants have to wait for police 
authorization before they can proceed to hold an assembly. Section 5 gives 
the police the absolute power of determining whether or not an assembly, 
meeting or procession should take place. The Supreme Court rightly stated 
that the right to assembly cannot be denied. However, the Court fails to 
identify that the right can still be abrogated if the police are allowed to 
cancel a public assembly without proper guidelines. The Court seems to 
                                                
14  Hon. Ferdinand Ndung’u Waititu & 4 others v The Attorney General & 9 
Others, Petition No. 169 of 2016, as per Onguto J.  
15  1967 HLR 1773. 
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think that it is clear from the Act that the reasons to be given for the 
cancellation of a peaceful assembly must comply with the Constitution. 
However, as already illustrated, the language of Section 5 of the Public 
Order Act expands the reasons for cancelling an assembly to beyond those 
given in the Constitution, namely, maintaining public peace and protecting 
the rights and properties of other people. In fact, the language of the Act 
does not even limit the reasons why the police can cancel a planned 
assembly – it only states that they can cancel an assembly out of an inability 
to police it. Apart from the foundational arguments already made, this 
scenario is clearly not envisaged by the Constitution – that an individual, 
whoever that might be, should be made the sole and unquestionable 
determinant of what is reasonably justifiable for the entire citizenry of 
Zambia. The Constitution does not in any way intend that the enjoyment of 
rights and freedoms enshrined by it in Articles 20, 21 and 28 be conditioned 
or contingent on the opinion of an official of the executive arm of 
government. A law which confers discretion on a public official, without 
indicating with sufficient precision the limits of that discretion, does not 
satisfy the quality of the ‘law’ contemplated in Article 21. 
 
This same view obtains in the Ghanaian Supreme Court. It held in New 
Patriotic Party vs. Attorney-General that “restrictions as are provided by 
Article 21(4) of the 1992 Constitution may be necessary from time to time 
and upon proper occasion. But the right to assemble, protest or demonstrate 
cannot be denied.”16 The Ghana Supreme Court nullified section 12 (a) of 
the Public Order Decree17 which gave police officers unfettered discretion 
to stop and cause to be dispensed with, any meetings or processions in any 
public place in contravention of Sections 7 and 8. It also nullified Section 
13(a) which made it an offence to hold such processions, meetings and 
public celebrations without permission. Similarly, the Court of Appeal in 
Nigeria, in Inspector-General of Police v. All Nigerian Peoples Party and 
Others, after holding the permit system under the Nigerian Public Order Act 
unconstitutional stated: “constitutions should be interpreted in such a 
manner as to satisfy the yearnings of the Nigerian Society.” The court 
observed: 
[The] Public Order Act should be promulgated to compliment section 
39 and 40 of the Constitution in context and not to stifle or cripple it. 
A rally or placard-carrying demonstration has become a form of 
                                                
16  1992-93 GBR 585-(2000) 2HBLRA, 1. 
17  Public Order Decree, 1972(NRCD) 
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expression of views on current issues affecting government and the 
governed in a sovereign state. It is a trend recognized and deeply 
entrenched in the system of governance in civilized countries. It will 
not only be primitive but also retrogressive if Nigeria continues to 
require a pass to hold a rally. We must borrow a leaf from those who 
have trekked the rugged path of democracy and are now reaping the 
dividend of their experience.18  
 
In re Munhumeso,19 the Zimbabwe Supreme Court held that powers placed 
in the hands of the police are arbitrary where (a) there is no criterion to be 
used to regulate the authority in the exercise of its discretion, (b) the 
regulating authority is not obliged to take into account whether the 
likelihood of a breach of peace could be averted by attaching conditions 
such as time, duration and route, and (c) it allows refusal of a permit even 
on the slightest possibility of breach of peace. This approach is supported by 
case law elsewhere in the world. In the US case of Shuttleworth v. 
Birmingham,20 the City Commission had been granted power by legislation, 
to refuse permission for a procession on such vague criteria as “public 
welfare, safety, health, decency and public morals.” The Court held that 
such power created an avenue for arbitrariness. It struck down the 
legislation. Similarly, in Gregory v. Florida21, a statute which gave the 
police almost unlimited discretion to decide whether or not demonstrators 
had committed a “diversion tending to a breach of peace” was declared an 
unconstitutional interference with the freedom of assembly. In 
Shuttleworth22, the Court stated that the test required for the restricting law 
is an objective one and should not depend on the subjective view or opinion 
of a police officer. 
 
The lack of a precise standard which the police must abide by when 
considering whether to abridge the right to peaceful assembly is therefore 
particularly damning. It makes Section 5 (6) of the Public Order Act open to 
arbitrary enforcement, as the police are not required explicitly by the Act to 
justify that their “inability to police” a planned public meeting or 
demonstration will lead to a breach of peace, should the planned meeting go 
                                                
18  (2) 18 NWLR 457 C.A. 
19  1994(1) ZLR 49(s). 
20  (1969) 394 US 147. 
21  (1969) 394 US 111. 
22  Supra note 17. 
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on without police supervision. This is contrary to Article 21 of the 
Constitution, and is not justifiable in an open and democratic country. 
 
The Supreme Court erred in finding that the only way Section 5 (6) of the 
Act offended the Constitution is by not providing a strict timeline for the 
police’s postponement of a planned meeting. In doing so, the Court 
validated the untenable situation where the police, in conforming to the Act, 
do not have to prove that a lack of police supervision of an event would 
probably lead to a breach of the peace. In addition, the police are 
empowered to cancel a planned meeting because of the potential that the 
planned protests may offend the sensibilities of the local residents – which 
in essence empowers the police to license the content of the message of the 
protest. The gravest error, however, lies in the Court’s misapprehension of 
the inalienable and fundamental nature of a fundamental human right. In the 
Court’s view, the midwifery of the right to peaceful assembly by the police 
is a foregone conclusion.  
